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Abstract 
Most of the natural resources we rely on for our existence on this planet 
could in one way or another be a subject to overexploitation through 
tragedy of the commons. Tragedy of the commons occurs when rational 
individuals all acting in their own self-interest creates a situation that is 
suboptimal for everyone involved (Hardin, 1968). For long privatization 
or government control over a common were seen as the only two options 
to avoid this tragedy. Through empirical studies Elinor Ostrom 
described a third alternative based on local self-governance where 
individuals themselves managed to collaborate around a scarce resource 
and create long-term sustainability (Ostrom, 1999).  
In this study the appropriateness of a self-governance 
system in small coastal societies and in the city of Gothenburg was 
assessed through a case study of recreational lobster fishers. Further on 
some factors to get acceptance for regulations in a common were 
highlighted. One of these factors was the development of social norms 
regarding regulations in lobster fishing. The norm development seemed 
to have followed a perceived crisis in the fishery. This visible decline of 
the stock made the fishers realize the importance of the regulations and 
thus internalizing them, creating a norm. Another important factor is 
that the stationary nature of the lobster. Lobsters live most of their life 
within the same area this can be expected to increase the incentives for 
fishers to treat the resource sustainably since a growth in the local stock 
will likely benefit the same fishers in the years to come.  
Based on the existence of social punishment for violators in 
the small coastal communities, it can be assumed that the social control 
in Grundsund and on Stora Kornö is much greater than in Gothenburg. 
Social control is one very important factor for the success of a self-
governance system; therefore it could be assumed to be easier to 
implement a self-governance system in the small coastal societies of 
Grundsund and Stora Kornö than in the city of Gothenburg.  
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Popular Science Summery 
Self-Governance in the Commons 
Many of our most precious natural resources are commons meaning that they are 
not owned privately nor completely controlled by the state. In 1968 Garret Hardin 
described in a soon famous article how these resources would be overexploited if 
not privatized or fully controlled by the government, he called this phenomenon 
“the tragedy of the commons”. In the 1990s Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom 
described a third way to govern the commons through collaboration between the 
resource users themselves in a system based on local self-governance.  
In self-governance the resource users themselves establish and enforce 
regulations to protect a common resource. To find out whether a self-
governance system would be suitable in Swedish fisheries a case study of 
the recreational lobster fishery in 
Sweden was conducted. Fishers 
from the small coastal towns Stora 
Kornö and Grundsund as well as the 
from the city of Gothenburg were 
asked to answer questions about 
why they follow established 
regulations and what they would do 
if they caught another fisher with 
illegal harvest.   
Through the interviews it became 
clear that it was not socially acceptable to harvest illegal lobster. This 
social norm seemed to have developed as a response to a decline in the 
lobster stock. The fishers in the small coastal communities would to a 
much greater extent use social punishment (e.g. ostracism, spreading the 
word etc.) if someone violated the regulations than the fishers in 
Gothenburg. The stronger social control in the small coastal towns 
indicated that they already have a structure that could facilitate a self-
governance system. This points to the fundamental conclusion that it 
would be easier to implement a self-governance system in contexts 
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where the feeling of local connection and common social norms are 
strong. 
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Introduction 
Many of the resources we rely on for our existence on planet earth are 
commons. In 1968 Garret Hardin published an article that came to be of 
great importance in how we understand the incentives behind the 
overexploitation of common resources. Hardin explains that the only way 
of preventing a common resource to become overexploited is for the 
government to take full control over it or for the resource to become 
subject to privatization (Hardin, 1968). For long these two options were 
the only ones considered when governing the commons but in the 1990s 
Elinor Ostrom, later a Nobel Laureate, drew attention to a third option 
for managing a common pool resource based on local self-governance 
(Ostrom, 1990). Systems of self-governance exist in many parts of the 
world and are usually developed as a response to the necessity of 
managing scarce resources. In a self-governance system the users 
themselves are developing and enforcing regulations concerning the 
common resource. This paper explores to what extent the need for 
external control over a common pool resource correlates with a high 
social capital and local connection. Further on it examines some 
important factors to get acceptance of regulations to avoid tragedy of the 
commons. The study is conducted through interviews with Swedish 
recreational lobster fishers. 
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Purpose and Issues 
The purpose of this study is to create an understanding of the 
underlying rationale behind law-abidingness of those using a common. 
Further on it examines if members of different communities differ in 
their reasoning and how this correlates to a strong sense of community 
and local connection. The surveyed locations are analyzed through 
Ostrom’s framework for a successful self-governance system in the 
commons. With the assembled information the aim is to evaluate if local 
self-governance in fisheries would be easier to implement in small 
coastal towns in Bohuslän rather than in a big city in the same coastal 
part. 
Research Questions 
v What are the important factors to get acceptance and compliance for 
regulations in order to avoid “tragedy of the commons” in a common pool 
resource? 
v Will high social capital and strong local connection decrease the 
importance of external control in a common resource? 
Definition of Key Terms  
In this study the normative terms used will be largely based on Elinor 
Ostrom’s definitions in her work on local self-governance.  
When evaluating the existence of high social capital three 
factors commonly used by Ostrom have been included. These factors are; 
(1) the presence of social networks and (2) trust amongst the resource 
users and (3) the existence of formal and informal rules (Ostrom and Ahn, 
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2009). Further on, social control is here referred to as the promotion of 
altruistic behavior and the discouragement of selfish behavior by making 
altruistic behavior the dominant social strategy within the community 
(Wilson et al. 2013).  
 The definition of social norms is taken from Ellikson’s 
(2001) and refers to “a rule governing an individual’s behavior that third 
parties other than state agents diffusely enforce by means of social 
sanction”.  
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Background 
Tragedy of the Commons 
Tragedy of the commons occurs when rational individuals all acting in 
their own best interest creates a situation that is suboptimal for all 
involved as well as for society in the long-term perspective. The 
phenomena was first described by Garret Hardin as a way of 
understanding why the earth’s human population will grow beyond the 
optimum level if left unregulated. The welfare state, according to Hardin, 
creates incentives for having more children by giving them all equal 
rights to the commons. The benefit of having one extra child will thus go 
exclusively to you while the cost of overpopulation will be borne by 
society. Overexploitation of common resources is an issue related to 
population rates only in specific contexts. This means that an action that 
today leads to a suboptimal outcome would not be a tragedy of the 
commons situation with a very small population.  Today, however, it is 
obvious that economic growth together with population cause increasing 
tragedy of the commons problems on our planet. 
Common Pool Resource (CPR) 
The types of resources most susceptible to tragedy of the commons are 
Common Pool Resources (CPR). The first criterion of a common pool 
resource is that it is non-excludable meaning that it is open for everyone 
to use. The second criterion is that one person’s usage of the resource 
decreases the ability of another person to use it, so-called subtractability 
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(Sarker et.al. 2015). The classic example of a CPR is fish. There is no way 
to exclude people from catching fish in the ocean and if a fisher catches 
one fish it means that there is one less for the rest of us to enjoy. The 
benefit of catching one extra fish will go solely to you and the cost of a 
depleted stock will be divided between everyone. Further on there is no 
incentive for the individual fisher to restrain from catching fish in order 
increase the fish stock for next year. This is a sad reality because it is 
impossible to make sure that other fishers won’t catch the fish you 
refrain from catching. “Freedom in commons brings ruin to all” stated 
Garret Hardin (1968).  
 This scenario is an example of what neo-classic economist 
would call the prisoners dilemma. A prisoners dilemma occur when the 
optimal choice for each individual by themselves lead to a worse 
outcome for everyone than if they could agree on each taking less for the 
benefit of both. The conclusion of this theoretical example is that if we 
are all rational individuals and we cannot collaborate, a commons will be 
ruined if left un-managed. For long this suboptimal scenario was said to 
be the destiny for all common resources if they were not either privatized 
or controlled by the government through regulations. But one important 
aspect of the prisoner’s dilemma was not fully acknowledged the fact 
that the prisoners were coerced into not collaborating (Ostrom, 1990). In 
the real world there are many empiric examples of when human beings 
have collaborated and sustained a resource over time despite the lack of 
private ownership or government control. Examples where a rational 
individual would benefit from taking more from a resource than optimal 
for the group but chooses not to because of the existence of strong social 
norms (Ostrom, 1990).  
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Overcoming Tragedy of the Commons in Fisheries 
The fishing industry has for long been a subject to tragedy of the 
commons, which have lead to both reduced profitability and declining 
stocks. A quarter of the world’s fish populations are at this present day 
overexploited and within the European Union 75 % of all the major 
fisheries are considered overfished (European Commission, n.d.). It is 
not only the commercial fishery that suffers from poor management, the 
recreational fishery is also considered unsustainable in many parts of the 
world (Johnston et.al. 2010). With this background massive research has 
been conducted to overcome these issues and create sustainability in the 
industry. Below follows a description of three different management 
strategies in fisheries to overcome tragedy of the commons: state 
ownership, privatization and self-governance.  
State ownership 
Regulation heavy, top-down, command and control management 
characterizes state controlled commons. Through massive external 
control and monitoring these regulations are supposed to deal with 
issues of non-excludability and subtractability. In fisheries they often 
focus on controlling fishing effort through input and output regulations. 
Examples of input regulations are requirements to use specific tools, 
limit the number of days allowed at sea and so on. Output regulations 
revolve around setting up quotas limiting the total allowable catch 
(TAC), forbidding fishers to throw away bycatch etc. (Squires & Bull, 
2014 and Prellezo et.al. 2012).  
The Swedish fishery has long been characterized by a top-
down government control and is today dependent upon the EU’s 
common fisheries policy (CFP) (Hav och Vatten, 2015). Command and 
 16 
control management has been criticized for being inflexible and 
decreasing the resilience of a system as well as leading to high 
monitoring costs (Holling & Meffe, 1996 and Sarker et.al. 2015). Some 
Swedish fishers criticize the current management strategy for involving 
too much bureaucracy and making it difficult to have more than one 
target species (Häggström et.al. 2014). Further on, command and control 
strategies in general have been critizised for not being able to create 
ecologically and econimcally sustainable fishery and for handeling the 
relationship with the fishers poorly, creating a destucitve incentive 
structure (Yagi et al. 2011 and Townsend, 1995).  
Privatization  
Privatization of a common resource can overcome tragedy of the commons 
and decrease the need for external control by changing the incentives of 
the users. Privatization is built on the premises that we are all rational 
individuals driven by our own self-interest and therefore we need to 
create situations where each person’s own self-interest aligns with 
society’s best interest. The theory is that by creating the right incentives 
it is not necessary to monitor and control the resource as much as in a 
state controlled system. With other words you internalize the negative 
externalities produced from overharvesting. On the other hand this 
narrow definition of human behavior as strictly rational and self-
interested has been criticized for over simplifying the complex processes 
underlying decision-making (Sethi & Somanathan, 1996).   
In 2009 the open sea pelagic fishery in Sweden got 
managed in a new way. A system of individual transferable quotas (ITQ) 
was implemented in order to create the same incentives as under a pure 
privatization (Paulrud & Waldo, 2011). The ITQs are rights that 
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fishermen own or lease and have the right to sell. The theory is that the 
ownership will create incentives for the fishers to treat the resource 
more sustainably in order to increase the value of the fishing right 
(Costello et.al 2008). The system has been successfully implemented in 
many fisheries for example in New Zeeland and Iceland (Mace et al 2013 
and Yagi et al 2012). One issue that many critics as well as Swedish in-
shore fishermen have stressed is that privatization in fisheries can lead to 
a decrease of the small scale fishery and tend to lead to a bigger 
concentration of fishing rights to a small number of big firms (Pálsson & 
Helgason, 1995, Chuenpagdee, 2011 and Eggert & Ulmestrand, 2008). 
This situation is created when it is more profitable for small-scale fishers 
to sell their rights to the bigger companies and leave the business. In one 
way this is a win-win situation where fishers who want change job, retire 
etc. can leave the fishing business, with a profit while companies who are 
more efficient and want to expand can increase their part of the quota. 
On the other hand one of the 16 environmental goals in Sweden 
(Miljömål, 2015) is to preserve the cultural values on the coast and in this 
aspect the ITQs leads to another type of tragedy of the commons. If all the 
fishers would act in their own self-interest many of the small-scale 
fishers would sell their right to bigger companies to make some money. 
This would lead to the disappearance of job opportunities on the coast, 
which in the long run will likely ruin the culture and the communities.  
Self-governance  
Self-governance is a system in between private and state ownership 
where the appropriators themselves manage the resource. Self-
governance overcomes tragedy of the commons by maintaining a high level 
of social control and creating social norms to sustain the resource (Sethi 
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and Somanathan, 1996). Elinor Ostrom developed the theory behind this 
type of management through empirical studies of existing self-
governance systems. In many of the examples of self-governance Ostrom 
studied the locals have themselves organized a system to share a scarce 
resource. Other scholars’ show that the evolution of self-governance 
usually occurs as a response to some sort of crises in resource supply, for 
example a rapid decline in the abundance (Olsson & Folke, 2001). 
Traditionally self-governance is thought of as a system with little or no 
government involvement but there are cases where the government plays 
an important role. In Japan the state used laws in order to encourage the 
development of self-governance in the early 1900s (Sarker et al., 2015).   
In successful self-governance systems Ostrom showed that 
even if the penalty for breaking established rules is lower than the 
benefit from unlawful harvest, people tend to follow the rules (Ostrom, 
1990). Through careful examination of small-scale (50 - 15 000 people) 
successful and unsuccessful cases of self-governing management she 
came up with 8 design principles that indicate a successful system. A 
successful self-governance system should have: 
1. A clear definition of who has the right to use the resource, who is 
in or who is out of the collaboration.  
2. Clear rules of allowed inputs and outputs e.g. gear, time, amount 
etc.  
3. Possibilities of the appropriators to design the regulations 
themselves.  
4. Hold users who do not follow the regulations accountable to the 
other users.  
5. Sanctions for rule breakers. 
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6. Existing arenas for conflict resolution.  
7. The ability for users to change regulations over time.  
8. Nested institutions (mostly important for larger self-governance 
systems).  
(Ostrom E. 2014) 
 
So why does Ostrom promote self-governance as an alternative system to 
government control and privatization? First of all she states that the 
earth consists of heterogeneous systems and is therefore in need of 
heterogeneous solutions. Self-governance will not be suitable for all 
commons but well for some (Ostrom, 1990). One of the advantages of 
self-governance is that by engaging the local population in the decision 
making process the need for external control can in some cases decrease. 
Examples from the Japanese coastal fishery show that by managing a 
resource within a group of people that are dependent on the resource 
and held accountable to each other instead of an external regulator it is 
possible to lower the monitoring costs (Makino, 2010). The Japanese 
example also shows that the state can play an important role in creating a 
sustainable fishery through a self-governance system by setting up 
regulations that the fishers must follow and then give them freedom to 
govern the resource within this framework (Sarker et.al. 2015).    
Since 2000 a type of informal self-governance also exists in 
Sweden in the waters around Koster on the Swedish west coast. The 
management is a collaboration between professional fishers, scientists, 
the county administrative board (Länsstyrelsen) in Västra Götaland, the 
agency for Water and Sea (HaV) and the municipalities (kommunerna) in 
Tanum and Strömstad. Through the collaboration fishers get the chance 
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to take classes in marine ecology at the local field station and decision 
makers can participate in a course lead by professional fishers in the area 
on the history and present practice of being a small-scale fisher. By 
letting the appropriators themselves participate in the decision making 
process it is easier to access the local ecological knowledge (LEK) 
existing within the community (Olsson & Folke, 2001). Even if the 
cooperation has no legal mandate it has been able to affect the regulatory 
framework by bringing forward solutions and bridging the gap of 
distrust between fishers, scientists and decision makers 
(Samförvaltningen Norra Bohuslän, n.d.).  
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Methodology 
This study examines how strong local connection and social capital 
affects the importance of external control in a common pool resource. 
The study is qualitative and was conducted through interviews with 
recreational lobster fishers preparing for the 2015 years premier. The 
questions were asked in person with the purpose of figuring out whether 
it is fear of getting caught by the coast guard (external control) or other 
fishers (internal control) that has the biggest impact on the legality of the 
fishers in the small coastal towns Stora Kornö and Grundsund and the 
fishers in the city of Gothenburg. Grundsund and Stora Kornö were 
chosen because they are both towns characterized by a strong 
community affinity and would therefore be expected to have a strong 
social control and high social capital. The marinas in Gothenburg on the 
other hand are big and close to the city and are thus expected to be more 
anonymous, potentially leading to less social control and social capital.  
 To further evaluate the appropriateness of a self-
governance system on Stora Kornö, Grundsund and Gothenburg the 
locations were assessed through Elinor Ostrom’s 8 design principles for 
a successful self-governance system.   
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Case Study 
Lobster fishing  
Lobster is a common pool resource regulated by the government. The 
lobster fishery in Sweden is non-excludable meaning that it is open to all 
citizens and if you restrain from catching too many lobsters there is no 
guarantee that other fishers will do the same. Further, if a fisher catches 
one lobster there is one less left for the rest the resource is subtractible. 
Lobster fishing is a popular activity on the Swedish west coast and every 
year around 9000 people fish for lobster using almost 100 000 lobster 
pots. Despite the fact that we use 70 000 more lobster pots today than in 
the 19th century the amount of lobster caught is less than half (Sundelöf, 
et al. 2013).   
To stop the negative trend in lobster fisheries the 
government has implemented several regulations. Today one person is 
allowed a maximum of 14 lobster pots if they are not a licensed fisher. 
Further on it is not allowed to harvest lobsters with a carapax length 
shorter than 80 mm and it is prohibited to keep females with visible 
spawn. The fishing season is limited to the 3rd Monday in September 
until the end of April. Despite these regulations a study from the 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences shows that it is not enough 
to sustain a viable lobster population (Sundelöf et al. 2013).  
The Swedish coast guard together with the county 
administrative board (Länsstyrelsen) in Västra Götaland and the agency 
for sea and water (HaV) are responsible for monitoring the lobster 
fishery outside Gothenburg and Bohuslän. Most of the violations of the 
law concerns incorrect labeling of lobster pots but there are also cases of 
illegal harvesting. The penalty for illegal harvesting of small lobsters and 
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egg bearing females is so called “day fines”. This type of fine is based on 
the detainee’s income (Vesterlund, 2015).   
Surveyed Sites 
The locations Stora Kornö, 
Grundsund and Gothenburg were 
chosen for this study due to 
expected differences in local 
connection and social capital 
amongst the fishers on the specific 
sites. On Stora Kornö and in 
Grundsund the social interactions 
between the fishers are expected to 
be more frequent than in 
Gothenburg, thus allowing the 
development of trustworthiness 
and informal rules.  
Stora Kornö  
Stora Kornö is an island located West of Lysekil on the West coast of 
Sweden. On the island there are 52 houses but as of 1970 there is no 
year round population. A strong community characterizes the island and 
the rates of people moving in and out is relatively low. Many of the 
people living on the island today are ancestors to the population living 
there in the 18th century. Its inhabitants privately own the island since 
1743. This ownership makes the population responsible for taking care 
of the roads, streetlights and other types of infrastructure. Maintaining 
the island’s infrastructure is made through workdays where all the 
community members contribute to the up keeping. The island also has a 
Picture 1 – Map over Southern 
Bohuslän; Fiskebäck, Hinsholmen, 
Grundsund and Stora Kornö. 
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community organization that organizes for example new plumbing 
systems on the island (Stora Kornö, 2015).  
Grundsund 
Grundsund is a small coastal town located on the island Skaftö in 
Lysekil’s municipality. The town has around 600 inhabitants year round 
and many of these have lived there for generations. In the summer on 
the other hand the population increase substantially (Lysekil, 2015). It is 
an old fishing town that used to be the biggest in Bohuslän in the 1920s. 
Today, only four fishing boats are left in Grundsund but the culture 
revolving fishing activities is still present in the town (Grundsund n.d.).  
Gothenburg  –Hinsholmen and Fiskebäck 
Gothenburg is Sweden’s second largest city with its 530 000 inhabitants 
(Vårt Göteborg, 2014). The city is located on the West coast and is 
surrounded by big ports. Although the biggest ports in Gothenburg are 
commercial shipping ports there are also a number of marinas where 
people engage in recreational lobster fishing.  
 The two marinas where fishers were interviewed were 
Hinsholmen and Fiskebäck. These are both big marinas relatively close 
to the city center of Gothenburg. Hinsholmen marina with its 1500 
berths is the second largest marina for pleasure boats in Gothenburg and 
Fiskebäck 930 berths is located next to Gothenburg’s biggest commercial 
fishing port (Hinsholmens båtförening, 2015 and Grefab, 2015).   
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Results 
Stora Kornö – Interviews with fishers 
Local connection and social capital amongst the fishers 
All the fishers on Stora Kornö answered that they knew everyone fishing 
lobster on the island. Five of the seven fishers I talked to were ancestors 
to the people who first bought the island in 1752 and the other two had 
more recently purchased a summer house on the island, one in the 1960s 
and one just four years ago. In the interviews it was revealed that lobster 
fishing was closely connected to social interactions and celebrations 
together with the community.  
Why do you follow the regulations in lobster fishing? 
When asked why the fishers on Stora Kornö follow the regulations 
regarding lobster fishing 3 out of 7 answered that they cared most about 
keeping the lobster population at a viable level. The other 4 were most 
concerned about following the law regardless of any sanctions. All of 
these 4 fishers put a viable lobster population as the 2nd most important 
aspect.  
If you broke the regulations – whom would you least want to get caught by: the 
coastguard, family and friends or other fishers? 
The fishers on Stora Kornö varied in their answers of whom it would be 
worst to get caught by. Three people said family and friends would be 
most embarrassing whereas four answered that they would be most 
worried about the coast guard. On the other hand all fishers agreed that 
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all three would be very embarrassing. All of them were almost appalled 
by the question and said things like: one would never do so or it is 
morally wrong.   
What would you do if you caught someone cheating?  
All but one of the lobster fishers on Stora Kornö would not initially 
report a violation to the coastguard but rather talk directly to the person 
in question. If the person wouldn’t listen some said they would report it 
whereas most said that they would spread the word in the community. It 
is clear that it is not socially acceptable to cheat and if it came out you 
would risk ostracism and nasty nicknames. One story many people told 
was about one man in Lysekil who harvested small lobsters, he was 
called Calle-tena (Calle lobster pot) all his life and even his son had to 
suffer from his father’s mistake by being called Calle-Tena’s son.  
One of the oldest fishers on the island, Ernst-Gunnar 
Gunnarsson, says that even if it nowadays is considered wrong to keep 
small lobsters and egg bearing females it didn’t use to be that way. Back 
when the regulations were first implemented the women on the island 
used to hide small lobsters in their skirts it was something everyone did. 
Ernst-Gunnar said that there was no acceptance of the regulations back 
then cause there was still so much lobster in the sea. 
Do you think the fishers on Stora Kornö would change their behavior if they 
knew that the coastguard would not monitor the fishery for a whole season?  
All but one of the surveyed fishers answered that they didn’t think 
anyone on Kornö would change their behavior. Some said that the social 
control is too high and that you would have to lie other fishers straight in 
their face to be able to cheat. Others said that it is ingrained in lobster 
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fishers that it is morally wrong to harvest small lobsters and females with 
visible spawn.   
Grundsund - Interview with fishers 
Local connection and social capital amongst the fishers 
One of the fishers did not live in Grundsund at the moment but was 
born and raised there. The other had a vacation home in Grundsund but 
said that he felt like a part of the community and that it was important 
for him to maintain his good reputation. Both of them said that they 
knew most of the fishers in the area.  
Why do you follow the regulations in lobster fishing? 
Both of the surveyed lobster fishers in Grundsund answer that their 
main objective when following the regulations in lobster fishing was to 
keep the population of lobster viable.  
If you broke the regulations – whom would you least want to get caught by: the 
coastguard, family and friends or other fishers? 
Family and friends and other fishers were the two fishers in 
Grundsund’s answer to this question. Both of them were least concerned 
about the coast guard.  
What would you do if you caught someone cheating?  
One of the interviewed fishers said he would tell everyone in the 
community unless it is really serious cause then he would press charges. 
The other fisher said he would talk to the affected fisher and threaten to 
spread the word.  
Do you think the fishers in Grundsund would change their behavior if they 
knew that the coastguard would not monitor the fishery for a whole season?  
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One of the fishers thought some might start harvesting illegal lobster but 
probably very few. The other didn’t think anyone would change their 
behavior because the regualtions are accepted within the community.  
Gothenburg - Interviews with fishers 
Local connection and social capital amongst the fishers 
None of the fishers in Gothenburg lived in the district where they had 
their fishing boats but lived in other parts of the city year round. Two of 
them said that they didn’t know many in the area that fished lobster 
recreationally whereas the other two said they knew basically everyone.  
Why do you follow the regulations in lobster fishing? 
Three of the fishers answered that the most important factor was to 
follow the law, regardless of sanction. The fourth one cared most about 
the lobster population.  
If you broke the regualtions– whom would you least want to get caught by: the 
coastguard, family and friends or other fishers? 
All of the fishers answered that it would be worst to get caught by the 
coastguard and least by family and friends. One of the fishers expressed 
that family and friends wouldn’t care at all.  
What would you do if you caught someone cheating? 
All of the surveyed fishers answered that they wouldn’t do anything if 
they saw someone cheat. They said that each one should mind their own 
business even if they also stated that it was wrong to break the law. One 
of them answered that he would be annoyed with the person but still do 
nothing. Another fisher told a story about a professional fisher on 
Vrångö, an island just outside Gothenburg, who fished lobster in an area 
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closed for lobster fishing. According to the interviewed fisher he made 
70 000 SEK and only had to pay a 30 000 SEK fine when he got caught. 
When asked how other fishers responded to this behavior he said that 
they mostly just laughed.  
Do you think the fishers in Gothenburg would change their behavior if they 
knew that the coastguard would not monitor the fishery for a whole season?  
In general the fishers thought that the behavior wouldn’t change but one 
said he thought that some people probably would catch a few more 
illegal lobsters. Another mentioned that the reason why it wouldn’t 
change was that it is not socially accepted in Fiskebäck to break the 
regualtions.  
Stora Kornö, Grundsund and Gothenburg analyzed through Ostrom’s 
8 design principles  
Here follows an assessment of the study sites through Ostrom’s 
framework for a successful self-governance system. The rankings are 
based on how well the locations matched Ostrom’s criteria. The 
evaluation was made through reflections from the interviews and 
background information on the locations. For a full assessment see 
Appendix 1.  
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Criteria Stora	  Kornö Grundsund Gothenburg 
1.	  Clear	  definition	  of	  who	  has	  the	  right	  to	  use	  
the	  resource 	  ++(+) ++	   +	   
2.	  Clear	  rules	  of	  allowed	  input	  and	  output 	  +++ +++	   +++ 
3.	  Ability	  of	  appropriators	  to	  design	  their	  own	  
rules. 	  n.a. 	  n.a. 	  n.a. 
4.	  The	  ability	  to	  hold	  violators	  responsible	  to	  
other	  users +++ +++ + 
5.	  Sanctions	  for	  violators 	  +++ +++ +++ 
6.	  Existing	  arenas	  for	  conflict	  resolution +	   + + 
7.	  Ability	  to	  change	  regulations	  over	  time. 	  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
8.	  Nested	  institutions 	  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sum	  of	  compliance	   	  13	   12	   9	  
 
  
Table 1. The study sites assessed through Ostrom’s framework for a successful self-
governance system. (+++ = Principle fully complied, ++ = Principle partly complied, + = 
Principle not complied n.a. = not applicable). For full assessment see appendix 1.   
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Discussion 
The necessity of external control in Gothenburg, Grundsund and 
Stora Kornö 
Through the interviews it appears as though the internal, social, control 
is stronger in the small coastal communities than in Gothenburg (see 
criteria 4; Table 1). In Grundsund and Stora Kornö social punishment 
(e.g. ostracism, spreading the word in town) would be used rather than 
legal punishment if someone got caught with illegal harvest. The fishers 
on Stora Kornö and in Grundsund described vividly how they would 
treat a cheater, everything from throwing the lobster back into the sea to 
telling everyone in the community about it before considering going to 
the authorities. In Gothenburg the fishers would neither tell on a 
cheater in town nor go to the authorities, indicating that the need for 
external control is higher.  
Potential for Self-governance in Swedish Coastal Fisheries 
Through my studies of the lobster fishing community on Stora Kornö, 
Grundsund and Gothenburg I would say that the potential of fulfilling 
the 8 design principles set up by Ostrom for a successful self-governance 
system is greater in the small coastal communities than in Gothenburg. 
The already existing social control can be used as a tool to monitor 
regulations set up by the community.  
Ostrom et al. (1999) further shows that strong social 
connections such as those present on Stora Kornö can facilitate the 
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development of social norms by increasing the number of interactions 
between people using the CPR. Playing the game of prisoner’s dilemma 
many times will give the players opportunities to gain trustworthiness, 
increasing their social capital and thus overcome tragedy of the commons 
(Ostrom, 1999). The probability of the game to be played many times is 
higher in small contexts, with a limited number of persistent members. 
In such locations the government can implement a self-governance 
system just by defining who has the right to use the resource (Townsend 
& Shotton, 2008). The looser social context in Gothenburg will probably 
make the fishery there more suitable for the establishment of an 
individual rights based system, such as ITQ.  
Adding to this the relatively high geographic seclusion and 
low population fluxes of primarily Stora Kornö but also Grundsund 
compared to Gothenburg creates a natural limitation of the number of 
members in the community. Drawing from an example of the Danish 
matjes herring fishery changing community members can turn a 
successful self-governance system into an unsuccessful one. The 
voluntary agreement between Swedish, Norwegian and Danish fishers 
was successfully maintained through the 90s but as the members of the 
agreement changed and the fleet became more heterogeneous, the 
system collapsed (Raakjär Nielsen & Olesen, 2008).  
Even though the small coastal towns show potential for 
self-governance through a strong social control there are other issues 
that might be more prevalent if we look at professional rather than 
recreational fishers. One of these issues is the lack of trust between 
scientists and fishers. In my study all of the interviewed fishers were of 
the opinion that the regulations in the lobster fishery were reasonable 
and essential for keeping a viable stock. This might not be the case in 
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other types of fisheries, a study from 2014 shows that even after several 
years of meetings and discussions between fishers and other 
stakeholders there is still many important questions where a consensus 
cannot be reached (Lundholm & Stöhr, 2014). On the other hand the 
collaboration in the waters around Koster shows that through meetings 
and knowledge exchange a mutual understanding is possible 
(Samförvaltning Norra Bohuslän, n.d.). Associate professor Mattias Sköld 
working on the project says in an interview that even though some 
fishers still violate the regulations, a number of more law-abiding 
individuals tell on their colleagues, creating a sort of social monitoring as 
a complement to the external control (Sköld, 2015). The co-management 
has created a culture much like the one on Stora Kornö and in 
Grundsund where social control is used as one mechanism to enforce 
regulations.  
Drawing conclusions on the appropriateness of 
implementing self-governance in Swedish coastal fishery through this 
particular study can further be problematic due to of the nature of the 
lobster. Unlike many commercial fish species lobsters live most their life 
in the same area creating stronger incentives for fishers to maintain a 
viable stock. This incentive might not exist in the same way when a 
fisher doesn’t know if it is them who will benefit from increasing stock 
or someone else.  
The Creation of Norms  
Even though the Swedish lobster fishery is governed by the state 
through a command and control system the regulations regarding 
harvesting small lobsters and egg bearing females seems so largely 
accepted that the control part is almost unnecessary. Many fishers 
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mentioned how it today is considered immoral to harvest illegal lobster 
and that the fishers wouldn’t change their behavior even if the 
monitoring stopped for one season. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) argued 
that this type of internalization of regulations making them into norms is 
one of the most important factors to facilitate self-governance. In a wider 
perspective creation of social norms could be a very strong tool to fight 
big environmental challenges of today, many which are characterized by 
tragedy of the commons. The way we think of contributing to a tragedy of 
the commons situation differs largely from case to case. Some 
contributing actions are considered immoral whereas others are not 
connected to any moral obligations. One example of a tragedy of the 
commons situation that is not yet connected to any moral obligations is 
the emission of greenhouse gases. Emission of greenhouse gases could 
be seen as a reversed tragedy of the common situation where more of a 
resource is negative. It is very hard to stop anyone from emitting 
greenhouse gases, it is not excludable, and for every molecule one 
person emits there is one less for the rest of us to emit before the whole 
system collapse. Slowly, big companies are starting to be held 
responsible for some of their emissions but for common people it is not 
yet a norm. Today almost no one will look askance at you for taking your 
fossil fueled car to pick mushrooms in fall or for driving your child to 
soccer practice. In lobster fishing the norm building seems to have 
followed as a response to the regulations when people started to realize 
the importance of them. When the regulations were first implemented 
people did not understand why they existed because they didn’t see the 
effects of a diminishing stock. Many of the fishers I spoke to talked about 
how they get far fewer lobsters today and was concerned over the 
viability of the population. Drawing from the conclusions of norm 
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building in lobster fisheries an important tool for creating a norm, in 
regard to climate change, is that the regulations set up by the 
international community as well as the nation states must become real to 
people through some sort of crises or visible change. The regulations in 
lobster fisheries were not accepted until people started seeing the effects 
of an overexploited resource. People must understand why they 
shouldn’t contribute to a tragedy of the commons before a social norm is 
created. Much like the example of some professional fishers distrust 
towards scientists, if there is no common understanding, the immorality 
of breaking a regulation does not exist. In climate change as we start 
seeing the effects of a warming climate the common ground grows, the 
skeptics become fewer and the probability of norm creation higher.  
What are the important factors to get acceptance for regulations in 
order to avoid “tragedy of the commons” in using a common pool 
resource? 
Two underlying factors observed in the case study that I would like to 
emphasize as important for the success of Ostrom’s 8 principles are the 
nature of the good and the importance of a crisis to catalyze the 
development of social norms. These two factors stand out when listening 
to the fishers elaborate on why they follow the regulations in the 
common pool resource. Even in Gothenburg where the fishers wouldn’t 
tell on a violator and where you could likely avoid being caught with 
illegal harvest the regulations seemed socially accepted and self-evident. 
Something that according to some fishers wasn’t the case before the 
lobster population started to decline.  
The nature of the good, as mentioned above, is important 
when it comes to the incentives for fishers to sustain a resource. With a 
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migrating resource overcoming tragedy of the commons would possibly be 
much more difficult. In economic theory this importance is observed 
many times over. One example is the establishment of agreements 
between different Native American families in the 17th century 
concerning the right to hunt beaver. These agreements were established 
as a response to a decline in the beaver population and managed to avoid 
a tragedy. When it comes to the Buffalo population defining hunting 
rights did not have the same success. Beavers are sedentary animals, 
meaning that they stay in the same area most their life whereas buffalos 
migrate over the Great Plains making it impossible to defend rights 
establish by the community (Stroup, n.d.). Today we can communicate 
easier between larger groups of people, something that could facilitate 
the development of social norms regarding less stationary resources but 
the process will probably be much harder.   
Reflections on the Chosen Method 
In this study recreational lobster fishing was used to analyze whether 
high social capital and local connection affects the users behavior when 
operating in a common pool resource. One issue with choosing 
recreational lobster fishing for a case study is that the fishers are not 
economically dependent on the resource and the incentives to keep 
illegal harvest could therefore be less tangible. Ostrom had 3 criteria for 
cases that she studied: that the resource is renewable, that it exists in 
scarcity rather than abundance and that the users can harm each other 
(Ostrom, 1990). The first two criteria suit well to lobster fishing while the 
third can be discussed. Since the lobster fishers in the study had little 
economic interest with their fishing and fished merely for fun, the risk to 
harm each other is a lot less prevalent than in professional fishing were 
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the appropriators depend on the resource for their living. All of the 
interviewed fishers claimed that there was almost never any conflict 
regarding the fishery, something that would be expected if fishers were 
economically dependent on the resource.  
Another issue with the study is the small sample size. To 
randomize the fishers interviewed they were all sought out in person at 
the marinas. This process was time consuming and did not always lead to 
results but since there is no record of recreational lobster fishers another 
strategy was hard to find. A general issue with in person interviews, part 
from being time consuming, is that the respondents might have 
answered differently due to the fact that I was present (Esaiasson, 2007). 
Some of the questions asked were fairly personal and even if they were 
designed to avoid dishonesties there is always the risk that the fishers 
portrayed themselves as more moral than they actually are.  
   
 
 
 
. 
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Conclusion 
In some situations it is possible to overcome tragedy of the commons 
without government control or privatization. However there are 
important conditions that have to be fulfilled to attain such a situation. 
In Swedish recreational lobster fisheries the development of social 
norms through a perceived crisis was one important factor behind 
changing the acceptance of existing regulations and ensure compliance. 
This was highlighted in the two small towns Grundsund and on Stora 
Kornö where the fishers stated that social rather than legal punishment 
would be used if someone violated the law. This type of social control is 
important to facilitate self-governance and only seem to exist in the small 
coastal communities. This leads to the conclusion that it would be easier 
to implement a self-governance system in contexts where the feeling of 
local connection and common social norms are strong, such as on Stora 
Kornö and in Grundsund.  
Suggestions for Future Research  
Future research on this topic could be to compare a non-migrating 
species such as lobster to a migrating species and see if the reasoning 
behind law-abidingness of the resource users would be the same. Further 
on it would be interesting to see if a dramatic decline in stock abundance 
is essential for developing a social norm or if norms can develop even 
though the change is incremental. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1  
Stora Kornö, Grundsund and Gothenburg analyzed through Ostrom’s 
8 design principles – Full assessment  
The first principle in Ostrom’s framework for a successful self-governing 
system is to have a clear definition of who is in and who is out of the 
collaboration. In my evaluation Stora Kornö acquired the highest score 
in regards to this principle. Stora Kornö is a small island only reachable 
by boat and it is thus easy to identify the members of the community. All 
interviewed stated that they knew all the other lobster fishers on the 
island. The parenthesis on the third star was added because the fishers 
on Kornö do not have exclusive right to the waters around the island. 
Several fishers interviewed expressed some level of distrust towards the 
law abidingness of these “outsiders” especially concerning fishery off-
season.  
Grundsund was given a lower score than Stora Kornö in this aspect 
due to fact that the town is accessible by car and thus less isolated. This 
means that in Grundsund it possible to have your fishing boat in the 
marina without owning a property there. One can assume that this will 
make it more difficult to control who fish lobster in the area.  
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Gothenburg scored the lowest in this category. The closeness to a big 
city for the marinas in Gothenburg makes it hard to know who is in and 
who is out of the lobster fishing community. Some of the fishers in 
Gothenburg didn’t know any of the other fishers in the marina, which 
indicates a lack of social control of the fishers in the area.  
The second principle regards clear rules of allowed inputs and 
outputs e.g. gear, time etc. All locations scored the same in this category 
as the government sets up the regulations and the fishers seemed well, 
and equally, aware of existing rules.  
The third principle is the possibility of the appropriators (the lobster 
fishers) to design the rules regarding the resource themselves. Since 
lobster fishing in Sweden today is not managed by a self-governance 
system this option does not exist in any of the locations. On the other 
hand, this principle can almost be considered fulfilled due to the wide 
acceptance of the regulations amongst the fishers. All the fishers in the 
study answered that the established regulations were good and should 
stay the same; some even said they should be stricter. Further on almost 
all the fishers believed that no one would change their behavior of the 
coast guard stopped monitoring for a season assuming that the fishers 
are right it clearly illustrates how well accepted the regulations are.   
Design principle four is the ability to hold users who do not follow 
the regulations accountable to the other users. Grundsund and Stora 
Kornö were given the highest compliance in this category and 
Gothenburg got the lowest. Most of the fishers in Grundsund and on 
Stora Kornö said that rather than reporting a violator to the authorities 
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they would tell everyone in the community as punishment. In 
Gothenburg on the other hand the fishers said they wouldn’t do 
anything if they caught someone harvesting illegal lobster. This indicates 
that social control doesn’t exist as strongly in Gothenburg and the 
fishers ability or maybe more accurate their desire to hold someone 
accountable is less prevalent.  
Principle five, sanctions for rule breakers, exists through government 
control. Daily fine or prison for serious offenses. The material sanctions 
are same in all locations. 
Number six - existing arenas for conflict resolution. Neither of the 
fishers surveyed mentioned any conflicts occurring in the lobster fishery 
part from pots getting stolen (in Gothenburg). Since people unknown by 
the community always made the thefts a conflict resolution was not 
possible.  
The seventh principle is the ability for users to change regulations 
over time. Such ability does not exist since there is no self-governance in 
the lobster fishery.  
Number eight is nested institutions, which is mostly important for larger 
self-governance systems and does not apply to the lobster fishery 
(Ostrom E. 2014). 
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Appendix 2 
Interview Questions – lobster fishers 
Bakgrund (Background): 
 
Ålder (Age):  
 
Kön (Sex):  
 
Bostadort (Hometown):  
 
Yrke (Profession): 
 
Äger/disponerar familjen fastighet på hummerfiske orten? (Does the family 
own or have access to property on the lobster fishing location?) 
 
Om JA hur länge har fastigheten funnits i familjen? (If YES how long has 
this property been in the family?) 
 
Bor du året runt?  (Do you live permanently where you fish lobster?) 
 
 
 
Hummerfiske: 
 
I. Hur många år har du fiskat hummer? (For how long have you 
engaged in lobster fishing?) 
 
II. Varför fiskar du hummer? (Why do you fish lobster?) 
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III. Fiskar du ensam? (Do you fish lobster alone?) 
 
a. Om INTE vem/vilka fiskar du med? (If NOT who do you fish 
with?) 
 
IV. Känner du många av de andra som fiskar hummer här i området? (Do 
you know many of the other lobster fishers in the area?) 
 
V. Ponera att du skulle ta upp en rom-hona; vem skulle det vara 
värst att bli påkommen av? (Ranka 1-3 där 1 är värst och 3 minst) 
(Imagine that you would keep a female with visible spawn; who would 
it be most embarrassing to get caught by? Ran 1-3 where 1 is most 
embarrassing and 3 least). 
a. Myndigheter (Kustbevakningen, HaV) (The officials; the 
Coast Guard or HaV) 
b. Andra fiskare – (Other fishers) 
c. Familj och vänner – (Familiy and friends) 
 
VI. Är nummer 1 mycket eller lite viktigare än nummer 2? (Is your first 
choice a lot more embarrassing than your second?) 
 
VII. Vad får dig att följa de bestämmelser som finns kring hummerfiske? 
Ranka följande orsaker efter från 1 - viktigast till 4 - Mindre viktigt 
(What makes you follow the regulations regarding lobster fishing? 
Rank following options 1-4 where 1 is most important and 4 
least). 
 
a. Hummerbestånd (hållbarhet) – (Sustainability of the lobster 
stock) 
b. Andra fiskares åsikter om mitt hummerfiske – (Other fishers 
opinion of my behavior). 
c. Böter eller fängelse – (Fees or prison). 
d. Vilja att följa lagen (oavsett eventuella sanktioner) – 
(Willingness to follow the law – regardless of sanctions) 
 
VIII. Om du upptäcker att någon annan inte följer reglerna, hur reagerar du 
då? (If you catch someone violating the law – what do you do?) 
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IX. Råder det god kännedom kring vilka regler som gäller inom 
hummerfiske? (Do you believe that fishers are well aware of 
existing regulations within the lobster fishery?) 
 
X. Tycker du att restriktionerna på hummerfiske är rimliga? (Do you 
think the regulations in lobster fishing are good?) 
a. Om INTE skulle de vara striktare eller lösare? (If NOT should 
they be stricter or looser?) 
 
XI. Om ytterligare restriktioner skulle införas vad skulle du då vilja se att 
de innefattade? (If more regulations would be implemented, which 
type would you prefer?) 
a. Ökat minimimått ( 
b. Maximimått –  
c. minskad säsong, -  
d. minskat antal tinor -   
e. fredade områden  –  
 
XII. Tror du hummerfiskarnas beteende på den lokala orten skulle ändras 
om de visste att kustbevakningen inte skulle kontrollera fisket under en 
tid? (Do you think the behavior of the lobster fishers in the local 
area would change if they knew that there would be no external 
control one season?) 
a. Om JA på vilket sätt? (If YES, how?) 
 
XIII. Skulle det kunna bli konflikter inom hummerfisket på den lokala orten? 
(Does conflicts ever occur regarding lobster fishing in the local 
area?) 
a. Om JA hur löses dessa konflikter?  
 
XIV. Finns det andra riktlinjer som du följer utöver de lagstadgade 
bestämmelserna? Ställen du inte lägger tinor på för att det är ”någon 
annans plats” eller dylikt. (Are there other guidelines you follow in 
addition to government regulations? E.g. some spots where you 
wouldn’t put your pots cause it is “someone else’s” etc. 
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XV. Är du personligen orolig för hummerbeståndet? (Are you personally 
worried about the lobster population?) 
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